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COMMENTS
THROTTLE ME NOT: 2015 OPEN
INTERNET ORDER PROTECTS
UNLIMITED DATA PLAN USERS
SHAWN MARCUM*
Cellphone carriers, also known as mobile broadband Internet access
service ("BIAS') providers, often implement throttling policies to avoid
investing in infrastructural development and to save on their bottom
line. Throttling is an intentional action to degrade or limit one's access
to the Internet, and speed limits are a great analogy to throttling
policies. The most visible throttling polices affect unlimited data plan
users, where mobile BIAS providers choose to severely degrade
unlimited data users' access speed to the Internet once they reach a
specified data cap-a limit on the amount of data a user may use within
a pay period However, by definition, an unlimited data plan cannot
have a data cap.
Just recently, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC')
released three new prophylactic rules in the 2015 Open Internet Order
that regulate how BIAS providers are to manage the Internet. This
Comment considers whether the "no throttling" rule successfully
prohibits cellphone carriers from targeting unlimited data users and
throttling them or whether targeting and throttling unlimited data users
fits within the exception to the "no throttling" rule. This Comment also
considers the negative impacts of throttling, especially on rural areas.
* Shawn Marcum is a second year law student at American University
Washington College of Law ("WCL") with a B.A. in both Mathematics and Political
Science from Georgetown College. Special thanks goes out to Professor Victoria
Phillips of WCL and a few employees at the FCC for their inspiring and invaluable
thoughts. Thanks also goes out to the author's family and friends as for without their
patience and support, this Comment would not have been possible. Last but not least,
the author is thankful to be apart of the American University Business Law Review,
where much dedication and hard work went into the publication of this Comment.
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INTRODUCTION
Throttling is an intentional practice that mobile broadband Internet
access service ("BIAS") providers use to slow down users' data throughput
speeds.' One major issue has arisen over the past few years: unlimited
data users have seen their Internet speeds dramatically slowed down after
using more than a predetermined amount of data within a pay-period even
though these users are supposed to receive "unlimited" data.2 President
1. See generally Mark Sullivan, What Happens When You Get Throttled?,
PCWORLD.COM (Feb. 29, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/251008/
what happens whenjouget throttled_.html.
2. See Phil Goldstein, T-Mobile: Throttling Policy for Unlimited Customers Who
Hit 21 GB is OK Under Net Neutrality, FIERCEWIRELESS (June 25, 2015),
http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/t-mobile-throttling-policy-unlimited-customers-w
ho-hit-21-gb-ok-under-net-n/2015-06-25; Joel Hruska, AT&T claims it will throttle
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Bill Clinton even pointed out on Jon Stewart's Daily Show that cellphone
carriers like AT&T Inc. ("AT&T") and T-Mobile US, Inc. ("T-Mobile")
want to quickly regain their infrastructural investments by implementing
throttling policies to side-step an open Internet instead of continuing to
develop mobile broadband infrastructure in rural areas.
3
Throttling unlimited data is analogous to an unlimited mileage
automobile rental agreement. Consider a car rental agreement which
clearly states that a rental car may be driven as far as desired during the
rental period. Imagine that the renter takes the car for a drive under the
impression that she can drive unlimited miles. After she drives 100 miles,
the car automatically slows down to five miles per hour and can go no
faster for the rest of the rental period. Clearly, no one would find this
unlimited mileage car rental plan to be practical, or even as fitting with the
deal that was advertised, if the unlimited plan only applied to the distance
and not the speed at which the car may be operated. Likewise, mobile
Internet users do not find their unlimited data plans to be what they paid for
4when their data is intentionally throttled after reaching a certain data cap.
This Comment argues that the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order's "no
throttling" rule successfully prohibits cellphone carriers-here, mobile
BIAS providers-from targeting unlimited data users and throttling them.
Considering the FCC's past regulatory problems in this area, the "no
throttling" rule must be proven applicable to mobile BIAS providers and
within the regulatory jurisdiction of the FCC. Additionally, the carriers'
practice of throttling unlimited data users must be shown to fall within the
purview of the "no throttling" rule and not its exception.
users after 22 GB of data, not 5GB, but forgets to inform customers,
EXTREMETECH.coM (Sept. 17, 2015, 10:12 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/
extreme/214472-att-claims-it-will-throttle-users-after-22gb-of-data-not-5gb-but-forgets
-to-inform-customers; Peter Jenkins, Sprint announces Connection Speed Throttling for
Unlimited Data Customers Using Over 23 GB, STOCKWATCH (Oct. 18, 2015, 6:30
AM), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalinklbd0706cc-2612-4a 1 -8fbl -09b7OfOeO6a
2/?context- 1000516. But see Roger Cheng, Verizon 's Grandfathered Unlimited Data
Users Face $20 Price Hike, CNET (Oct. 5, 2015, 6:40 AM) http://www.cnet.
com/news/verizons-grandfathered-unlimited-data-users-face-20-price-hike/ (seeing an
increase in their monthly bill and have to pay full price for phones, unlimited data
users, as of yet, will not be throttled).
3. Interview by Jon Stewart with President Clinton, in New York, NY (June 17,
2015) [hereinafter "President Clinton Interview"].
4. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2 (upsetting customers when T-Mobile's new
policy throttles its unlimited data users' mobile Internet speeds once they use twenty-
one gigabytes of data); Margaret Harding, AT&T Hit With Class Action Over
Misleading Data Plans, LAw360 (June 23, 2015, 3:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/671122/at-t-hit-with-class-action-over-misleading-data-plans (reporting that a
woman filed a class action lawsuit because AT&T breached its contract by throttling
unlimited data users).
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Section II of this Comment provides background on the throttling issue
and illustrates a need for throttling regulation. It then shows how past
regulatory attempts at throttling failed. Finally, it presents the FCC's latest
attempt at regulating throttling. From this background, Section III
concludes that targeting and throttling unlimited data users is illegal under
the FCC's latest regulatory attempt. To do so, Section Ill(A) analyzes the
reasonableness of the FCC's reclassification of mobile BIAS providers as
telecommunications. Section Ill(B) considers whether the "no throttling"
rule is within the FCC's regulatory jurisdiction. Section III(C) discusses
how the targeting and throttling of unlimited data users does not fit within
the legitimate network management practice exception to the "no
throttling" rule.
Lastly, Section IV recommends that the FCC's "no throttling" rule
remain unchanged and effective because it is good public policy that
promotes business competition in the United States. Consequently, Section
V concludes that the "no throttling" rule is good for the public because it
not only considers the needs of mobile BIAS providers, but it also takes
into account the interests of cellphone carriers' customers, while enhancing
economic stability throughout the United States via more reliable mobile
broadband in rural areas.
II. BIAS PROVIDERS' CLASSIFICATION IMPACTS THROTTLING PRACTICES
This Section will illustrate the need for regulation. First, it will reveal
who is throttling and how prevalent throttling is in the mobile broadband
market. Afterwards, this Section will explain why throttling has not been
regulated. And third, it will describe.the FCC's current attempt o regulate
the practice.
A. Prevalent Throttling Policies Illustrate the Need for Regulation
Limited competition in the mobile broadband market contributes to the
increased use of throttling policies. There are only four cellphone carriers
that provide mobile BIAS for most of the mobile broadband users in the
United States.5 However, in many rural areas, there are even fewer
6carriers. With a small mobile BIAS market, users are limited in their
5. See Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Seventeenth Report, 29 FCC Rcd. 15311, 15317, 12 (2014) [hereinafter
"2014 Mobile Wireless Competition Report"] ("As of year-end 2013, there were four
facilities-based mobile wireless service providers in the United States that industry
observers typically describe as 'nationwide.' These providers include AT&T, Sprint,
T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless. Although none of these four providers has a network
that covers the entire land area or population of the United States, each has a network
that covers a significant portion of both .... ").
6. See National Broadband Map: Number of Broadband Providers, FCC,
234 Vol. 5:2
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choice of a cellphone carrier with favoring policies.7 At the time of this
writing, Verizon Wireless ("Verizon") is the only national mobile BIAS
provider of the four nationwide providers-AT&T, Sprint Corporation
("Sprint"), and T-Mobile-to give up its unlimited data throttling policies.
8
As a result, if an unlimited data user lives in an area not covered by
Verizon, then that user will likely experience throttled data after consuming
a predetermined amount of data.9 For example, Sprint just recently decided
to throttle its unlimited data customers after they use more than twenty-
three gigabytes in a monthly pay period. ' 0
Moreover, cellphone carriers argue that throttling is an effective way to
manage networks because of the increased use of mobile broadband.'
Consequently, most nationwide cellphone carriers have implemented or are
currently implementing throttling polices.'2  To put this in perspective,
almost all mobile broadband users are customers of the four major BIAS
providers, where, at one time, all four throttled their customers and where,
now, three continue to throttle for what they claim are network
management purposes.13  Similarly, throttling users in underdeveloped,
rural areas is easier than investing in upgrading the rural infrastructure by
building new towers and updating old ones.14 As such, carriers often do
http://www.broadbandmap.gov/number-of-providers (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
7. See id.; see also supra note 2.
8. See supra note 2.
9. See supra note 2 (pointing out that T-Mobile throttles after 21 GB; AT&T
throttles after 22 GB; and Sprint throttles after 23 GB).
10. See Jenkins, supra note 2.
11. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Red. 5601, 5636-37,
90 (2015) [hereinafter "2015 Open Internet Order"] (illustrating that "consumers ...
increasingly rely on mobile broadband as a pathway to the Internet"); id. at 5636, 89
("[T]here has been an increase of more than 200,000 percent in the number of LTE
subscribers, from approximately 70,000 in 2010 to over 140 million in 2014.
Concurrent with these substantial changes ... mobile data traffic has exploded,
increasing from 388 billion MB in 2010 to 3.23 trillion MB in 2013."); id. at 5639-40,
96 ("[S]ignificant concern has arisen when mobile providers' have attempted to
justify certain practices as reasonable network management practices, such as
applying speed reductions to customers using 'unlimited data plans' in ways that
effectively force them to switch to price plans with less generous data allowances.")
(emphasis added); see also, e.g., id. at 5636, 89 (raising AT&T's and T-Mobile's
comments that their wireless data traffic has grown exponentially year after year).
12. See supra note 2.
13. See 2014 Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 5, at 15317, 12;
see also Thomas Gryta, An Early Net-Neutrality Win: Rules Prompt Sprint to Stop
Throttling, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2015, 10:41 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/an-
early-net-neutrality-win-rules-prompt-sprint-to-stop-throttling- 1434595276 (reporting
that Sprint stopped throttling as soon as it saw AT&T got fined for throttling right after
the 2015 Open Internet Order became effective); Jenkins, supra note 2 (showing that
Sprint now throttles as a way to manage its network).
14. See Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, FCC at 136 (Mar. 17,
2016 235
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not have or want to spend the capital to invest in rural broadband
infrastructural development.1
5
The prevalence of throttling policies among mobile BIAS providers is
concerning for rural areas.'6 There are many rural areas where access to
mobile broadband is limited to only a few choices (and in some locations,
only one choice) of mobile BIAS providers.'7  So, when a mobile BIAS
provider throttles these users' data, these users have degraded broadband
access to the Internet, which typically means they have no broadband
access at all during the throttling times. Additionally, with fewer choices
or even no choices at all in mobile BIAS providers, rural broadband users
have little to no means of evading unfavorable policies like throttling.'
8
For example, the costs facing subscribers to switch providers is high and
likely prohibitive for many users to move to another carrier's mobile
broadband service.i9
B. BIAS Providers'Prior FCC Classification Prevented Regulation
The FCC has the responsibility to take immediate action to remove
2010), https://transition.fcc.gov/national-broadband-plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf
[hereinafter "The National Broadband Plan"] ("Because service providers in [rural]
areas cannot earn enough revenue to cover the costs of deploying and operating
broadband networks, including expected returns on capital, there is no business case to
offer broadband services in these areas."); see also Broadband in Rural Areas, FCC,
http://www.broadband.gov/ruralareas.html ( ast visited Oct. 23, 2015) ("Because of
relatively low population density, topographical barriers, and greater geographical
distances, broadband service may be more difficult to obtain in some rural areas.").
15. See supra note 14; cf Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion,
and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement
Act, 30 FCC Rcd. 1375, 1402, 42 (2015) [hereinafter "2015 Broadband Progress
Report"] (adopting broadband at similar rates, where rural Americans adopt at twenty-
eight percent and urban Americans at thirty percent).
16. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5636-37, 90 (noting, after
considering several studies, that "rural consumers ... are more likely to rely on mobile
as their only access to the Internet").
17. See supra note 14; cf id. ("[R]ural consumer and businesses often have access
to fewer options for Internet service, meaning that these customers may have limited
alternatives when faced with restrictions to Internet openness imposed by their mobile
provider.").
18. See supra notes 17 and 19; see also 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11,
at 5636-37, 90.
19. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5641, 98 ("Based on results
from surveys, . . . switching costs have depressed mobile wireless churn rates, meaning
that customers may remain with their service providers even when they are
dissatisfied."); see also id., at 5641-42, 1 98 ("Choices may be particularly limited in
rural areas, both because fewer service providers tend to operate in these regions and




barriers to infrastructural investment and to promote competition in the
telecommunications marketplace so that broadband Internet access is
"deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion. ' 0  In
carrying out this responsibility bestowed by Congress, the FCC determined
that the Internet needed to be regulated to prevent unfavorable policies-
like throttling-from keeping the Internet open and unrestricted for its
users. 2 However, for nearly a decade, the FCC has failed to regulate the
Internet in a manner that prevents harmful policies while -keeping the
Internet equally open to all.
22
The FCC's regulatory tribulations started in 1980 when it defined "basic
services" as common carrier services regulated under Title It and
"enhanced services" as non-common carrier services not to be regulated
under Title 11.23 The difference between a "basic service" and an
"enhanced service" was how the service processed information.24 For
example, a telephone call simply transmits a sound between recipients
without processing any information.25 In fact, the FCC "characterized
telephone service as a 'basic' service ... because it involved a 'pure'
transmission that was 'virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with
customer supplied information.' 2 6 However, a service that allows an
individual to access the Internet must process the transmitted information it
receives, making it an "enhanced service.' 27 For example, BIAS providers
must translate e-mails into binary code, which are then subdivided into
packets, to be carried out and delivered to the e-mail's respective recipient.
Therefore, BIAS providers must operate a service that requires more than
just transmitting e-mail in "pure" textual form, thereby qualifying as
"enhanced services" not subject to Title I common carrier regulations
under this definition.28
Against this backdrop, Congress defined telecommunications
providers-telephone operators-as "basic service" providers and
information service providers-BIAS providers-as "enhanced service"
20. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a)-(b) (2015).
21. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5606, 11.
22. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 630-35 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining the
history of FCC's attempts at Internet regulation).
23. See id. at 629-30 (citing In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the
Commission's Rules and Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 (1980) [hereinafter "1980
Computer II Rules"]).
24. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 630 (citing 1980 Computer II Rules at 420-21).
25. Id.
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providers in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.29 As a result,
telecommunications providers were subject to the Title II common carrier
rules whereas information service providers were not.30  However,
Congress left to the FCC the power to define these terms.
31
In the 1998 Advance Service Order, the FCC defined Digital Subscriber
Line ("DSL") providers-Internet services via telephone lines-as
telecommunications providers because they could exempt their Internet
services from the Title II common carrier restrictions since they were
operating their Internet services through a quasi-independent entity.
32
However, the FCC's 2002 Cable Broadband Order defined cable
broadband providers-Internet services via cable television lines-as
information service providers because cable BIAS providers offered no
telecommunications services to separate out like a telephone
communications service, essentially blocking these providers completely
from Title II regulation.33
Up until this point, the FCC took an unregulated approach to Internet
service providers to stimulate broadband infrastructural growth, but that
approach soon changed. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass 'n v.
Brand X Internet Services, the FCC tried to apply Title II common carrier
regulations on cable Internet service providers under the theory of Title I
34ancillary jurisdiction in the 2002 Cable Broadband Order. The agency
applied common carrier obligations to "non-common carrier" services so
that it could carry out its statutory function of ensuring the advancement of
telecommunications and information services.35 However, in Brand X, the
Supreme Court did not approve of this ancillary jurisdiction approach,
29. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 153(24), (50), (51), (53) (2015).
30. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(53).
31. See Verizon,740F.3dat630.
32. See id. at 630-31 (citing In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012, 24014 (1998)
[hereinafter "1998 Advance Service Order"]).
33. See id. at 631 (citing In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4802, 4824 (2002)
[hereinafter "2002 Cable Broadband Order"]).
34. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
976-77 (2005).
35. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (ruling that the
FCC may exercise authority under its general subject matter jurisdictional grant in Title
I of the Communications Act to matters that are "reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the [FCC]'s various responsibilities" set out in other titles of the
Communications Act and other statutes); see also Am. Library Assoc. v. FCC, 401
F.3d 689, 700-03 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the FCC may exercise ancillary
jurisdiction if (1) the FCC's general jurisdictional grant under Title I covers the subject




reasoning that the FCC's classification of Internet service providers as non-
telecommunications providers was a reasonable interpretation of the 1996
Telecommunications Act's ambiguous telecommunications provision.
36
Therefore, regardless of ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC's classification of
Internet service providers barred application of Title II regulations to those
entities providing Internet services.
37
After Brand X, the FCC continued to classify Internet services as non-
telecommunications services. The FCC's 2005 Wireline Broadband Order
defined all wired services providing Internet access as information service
providers-even including DSL-and placed the two main forms of wired
Internet (cable and DSL) under the same classification, consequently
barring Title II application.38 Additionally, in its 2007 Wireless Broadband
Order, the FCC defined all wireless Internet services as non-
telecommunications services, thus exempting cellphone carriers from Title
II common carrier regulation.39 Therefore, the FCC defined all Internet
service providers as non-telecommunications service providers, meaning
that all Internet service providers were explicitly exempt from Title I
common carrier regulation.40
Nevertheless, the FCC announced that if any BIAS provider attempted to
violate its intention to "preserve and promote the open and interconnected
nature of the public Internet," it would not hesitate to take action, even if
that meant applying common carrier obligations on broadband providers
via ancillary jurisdiction.41 Just one year later, the FCC presented the 2008
Comcast Order after it discovered that Comcast Corporation ("Comcast")
was blocking and degrading its customers' access to BitTorrent Inc., a
peer-to-peer file sharing service.42 The 2008 Comcast Order once again
asserted ancillary jurisdiction to place a common carrier obligation-that
a broadband provider may not manage its network with policies that
intentionally blocked or degraded its customers' access to legal websites-
36. See id.; f Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 202
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983) (finding that the FCC has ancillary
jurisdiction to regulate non-common carrier activities of common carriers).
37. See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 976-77.
38. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 631 (citing In re Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Red. 14853, 14862
(2005) [hereinafter "2005 Wireline Broadband Order"]).
39. See id. (citing In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access
to the Internet Over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5901-02 (2007)
[hereinafter "2007 Wireless Broadband Order"]).
40. See supra notes 29-39.
41. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 631 (quoting 2005 Wireline Broadband Order at 14,988).
42. See id. (citing In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge
Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC
Rcd. 13028, 13059-60 (2008) [hereinafter "2008 Comcast Order"].
2016
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-on Comcast, a non-common carrier, broadband provider.43
However, in Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit Court vacated the
2008 Comcast Order as an improper exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.4
Simply put, the FCC was bound by its interpretation of broadband Internet
service providers as non-telecommunications service providers, and
therefore, it could not impose common carrier obligations on non-common
carrier services when the FCC explicitly classified broadband Internet
service providers as non-telecommunication services.45 The court found
that the FCC may change its interpretation of broadband Internet service
providers with adequate reasons for a policy reversal.4 6 With good
justification, the FCC could reclassify broadband Internet service providers
as telecommunications providers so that Internet service providers are
regulated under Title II common carrier obligations.47
Instead of reclassifying Internet service providers as telecommunications
so that the FCC could regulate them under Title II and impose common
carrier obligations-for example, preventing the intentional slowing down
of Internet services (i.e., no throttling)-the FCC kept the classification the
same in the 2010 Open Internet Order, implementing ancillary jurisdiction
once again.48
In the 2010 Open Internet Order, the FCC created three prophylactic
rules that required BIAS providers to (1) be transparent and (2) not
discriminate or (3) block access to lawful websites.49 The FCC created
these rules because it needed to do something to promote the advancement
and preserve the integrity of the Internet when a study showed that seventy
percent of the nation did not get adequate or any broadband service at all.50
Once again, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Verizon v. FCC vacated
most of the 2010 Open Internet Order on the same grounds as it did in
Comcast and as the Supreme Court did in Brand X: because the FCC
attempted to exercise improper ancillary jurisdiction to attach common
carrier obligations to entities it had explicitly defined as non-common
43. Id. But see Am. Library Ass'n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 689, 700-03 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
44. 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
45. Id.; see also Computer and Comm. Indus. Ass 'n, 693 F.2d at 202.
46. Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 661.
47. Id.
48. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 633 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing In re
Preserving the Open lnternet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905, 17905 (2010) [hereinafter "2010
Open Internet Order"]).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 640-41, 47; see also 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2015) (stating that the
FCC is to encourage broadband "deployment on a reasonable and timely basis").
240 Vol. 5:2
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carriers.5' Although the court upheld the transparency requirement of the
2010 Open Internet Order, which did not impose common carrier
obligations but instead competitive market values, it vacated the anti-
blocking and anti-discrimination rules because these rules imposed
common carrier obligations on broadband Internet service providers,
limiting what BIAS providers could do with their own services.52
Notice that up until this point, the courts never overruled the FCC's
classification of Internet service providers' as non-telecommunication
services nor did the FCC ever reclassify these services to apply Title II
common carrier obligations on BIAS providers.
53
C. 2015 Open Internet Order: BIAS Providers' Reclassification and
Common Carrier Obligations
In response to the BIAS provider's unreasonable policies like throttling
and the unsuccessful attempts to regulate BIAS providers, the FCC
implemented the 2015 Open Internet Order under the same enabling
statutes as the 2010 Open Internet Order-Section 706 of the 1996
Telecommunications Act and Title II of the revised 1934 Communications
Act.54 The 2015 Open Internet Order achieves two main objectives: (1) it
reclassifies BIAS providers as telecommunications service providers,
51. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 655-59.
52. Id. (holding that Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1996 vests the
FCC with authority to "enact measures encouraging the deployment of broadband
infrastructure" and that the FCC interpreted this statute "to promulgate rules governing
broadband providers' treatment of Internet traffic." However, the Court found that the
Communications Act prohibits the FCC from regulating broadband providers as
common carriers having already "classif[ied] [them] in a manner that exempts them
from treatment as common carriers." That is, having previously exempted certain
broadband providers as information service providers that are exempt from Title [I
common carrier obligations, the court found that he FCC could not regulate them by
imposing anti-discrimination and anti-blocking obligations on them.).
53. See id.
54. Craig D. Dingwall, Summary of Net Neutrality Rules, TECHNOLOGY LAW
GROUP, LLC (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.tlgdc.com/pdfs/snaparchives/SnapUPdate%
20Net%2ONeutrality%2ORules%2003-24-15.pdf ("The FCC noted in its [2015 Open
Internet] Order that '[c]hanged factual circumstances cause us to revise our earlier
classification' of BIAS, including evolving business relationships among cable
operators and their service offerings, as well as a 'rapidly changing market' for
broadband Internet access services. The FCC also noted that mobile broadband
networks are faster, more broadly deployed, more widely used and more
technologically advanced than they were in 2010, and that network connection speed
and data consumption have xploded. But do these and other changes justify such a
broad change in classification, or are these rules merely a thinly-veiled response to the
Verizon court remand and President Obama's Internet goals?"); see also Press Release,
White House, Net Neutrality: President Obama's Plan for a Free and Open Internet (on
file at https://www.whitehouse.gov/net-neutrality) (last visited June 27, 2015)
[hereinafter "White House Net Neutrality Press Release"].
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which applies Title II common carrier obligations to broadband providers;
and (2) it implements three prophylactic, common carrier rules-no
blocking, no throttling, and no paid prioritization.55 For the purposes of
this Comment, only the "no throttling" rule will be presented and
subsequently analyzed.
The "no throttling" rule states that a BIAS provider may not slow down
Internet access to any lawful Internet use except for a reasonable network
management purpose:
56
A network management practice is a practice that has a primarily
technical network management justification, but does not include other
business practices. A network management practice is reasonable if it is
primarily used for and tailored to achieving a legitimate network
management purpose, taking into account the particular network
architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access service.
57
The FCC deems this exception necessary to the rule because broadband
providers need the ability to optimize their network performance to
maintain a quality experience for their customers while not being unfair to
their customers.58 For this exception to apply to an infringing throttling
practice, the FCC notes that a BIAS provider must show that a technical
network management matter-instead of some other business reason-
justifies its practice.59 However, the FCC considers targeting and throttling
unlimited data plans to be a practice where the "reasonable network
management" exception does not apply.
60
Moreover, the 2015 Open Internet Order dedicates an entire section to
mobile broadband services because a significant portion of its record
concerned mobile BIAS providers' practices.61 In this Section, the FCC
addressed the incentives and technical abilities that mobile BIAS providers
55. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5604 (executive summary).
56. See id at 5651, 1 119 ("A person engaged in the provision of broadband
Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not impair or
degrade lawful internet traffic on the basis of Internet content, application, or service,
or use of a non-harmful device, subject to reasonable network management.").
57. Id. at5700, 215.
58. Id.
59. Id. 216 ("If a practice is primarily motivated by such an other justification,
such as a practice that permits different levels of network access for similarly situated
users based solely on the particular plan to which the user has subscribed, then that
practice will not be considered under this exception.").
60. Id. at 5639-40, 96 ("[S]ignificant concern has arisen when mobile providers'
[sic] have attempted to justify certain practices as reasonable network manage
practices, such as applying speed reductions to customers using 'unlimited data plans'
in ways that effectively force them to switch to price plans with less generous data
allowances.") (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 5635-43, 77 86-101.
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have to limit the open Internet with policies like throttling.62 It illustrated
that mobile broadband has blossomed over the past five years due to faster
network deployment.63 The growth of the mobile broadband network is so
fast, in fact, that more and more people are relying on mobile BIAS.64 The
FCC even pointed out that the "evidence shows that . .. rural consumers
... are more likely to rely on mobile as their only access to the Internet.,
65
Likewise, the National Health Interview Survey presented data showing a
large uptick in the number of wireless-only households.66
Furthermore, the FCC looked at the technology behind mobile BIAS
providers and found that mobile BIAS providers have better means to
manage their networks in accordance with the three prophylactic rules in
67the 2015 Open Internet Order. Consequently, they have the technological
means to implement restrictive policies as well, like targeting unlimited
data users and throttling them.
68
The FCC also illustrated that mobile BIAS providers act as gatekeepers
to the Internet, which contributes to increased market power that allows
them to implement unfavorable, restrictive policies.69  Since there are
typically few mobile BIAS providers in rural areas, and since they have the
technical means to implement harmful policies, mobile BIAS providers
will implement these policies, like throttling, so long as they maintain
strong market power.7 ° One anticompetitive policy that all providers
implement with their gatekeeper status is unfair switching costs-a
measure they employ to keep customers tied to a mobile broadband
policy.7' Switching costs can be extremely high especially when a user has
to move every member of a shared plan to another provider.72 As such,
62. Id. at5631-32, 81.
63. Id. at 5636, T 89.
64. Id. at 5636-37, 190.
65. Id.
66. Id. ("44 percent of households were 'wireless-only' during January-June 2014,
compared to 31.6 percent during January-June 2011 .").
67. Id. at 5639-49, 96.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 5608, 20.
70. Id. ("[T]his has been a period of market and spectrum consolidation, which has
decreased the choices available to consumers in many parts of the country. For
example,.., recent mergers ... have reduced the ability of wireless end users to switch
to competing providers .... ") (internal quotations omitted).
71. Id. at 5640, 97 (citing comments from Microsoft Corp., which provided that
"even if there is more than one mobile broadband access provider in a specific market,
there may not be effective competitive alternatives.., and these mobile broadband
access providers retain the ability to act in a manner that undermines the competitive
neutrality of the online marketplace'?).
72. Id. at 5642-43, 99.
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market power coupled with policies that keep customers tied to a particular
service provider allow for mobile BIAS providers to implement throttling
policies and the like more easily without customers leaving.73 Therefore,
the FCC illustrated in the 2015 Open Internet Order that high demand,
technical ability, and limited competition incentivize restrictive polices like
throttling, and thus a need for regulation to keep the Internet open and free
from these restrictive policies.
74
III. THROTTLING IS ILLEGAL AND NEGATIVELY AFFECTS ECONOMIES
Nevertheless, the real question that remains is whether the FCC's 2015
Open Internet Order will be successful upon judicial review or will it sink
like the 2010 Open Internet Order did upon the Verizon court's review. For
the 2015 Open Internet Order to be successful upon judicial review, the
FCC's reclassification of BIAS providers as telecommunications must be
reasonable, and the Order's rules must be within the FCC's regulatory
authority. After analyzing whether the 2015 Order will be successful upon
judicial review, this Comment will answer whether the FCC successfully
prohibits mobile BIAS providers from targeting and throttling unlimited
data plans under the 2015 Open Internet Order's "no throttling" rule.
A. Reasonable Reclassification of BIAS Providers
Judicial history supports the FCC's reclassification of BIAS providers as
telecommunications providers as reasonable,75 and thereby, these providers
are subject o the 2015 Open Internet Order's common carrier obligations.
In 2005, the Supreme Court in Brand X reasoned that the FCC could
reclassify BIAS providers if it "adequately explains the reasons for reversal
of policy."'76  However, the Supreme Court here upheld the FCC's
classification of BIAS providers as non-telecommunications because that
was the FCC's classification at the time and because that was a reasonable
interpretation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act's ambiguous provision
defining telecommunications ervices.7
Then, in 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court in Comcast Corp. restated that the
Administrative Procedure Act allowed the FCC to define any ambiguous
73. See id.
74. Id. at 5628, 1 78.
75. See infra text and parenthetical accompanying note 76. See generally
Alexander Hurst, Neutering Net Neutrality: What Verizon v. F.C.C. Means for the
Future of the Internet, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 43 (2015) (providing general
overview of Internet neutrality regulatory history).
76. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (finding that the FCC's classification was entitled to deference even if the
FCC's interpretation of its classification is inconsistent with its prior interpretation).
77. Id. at 991-92.
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enabling statute as it as it saw fit, so long as its interpretation was
reasonable.7 8 The court even stated that the FCC might have had a good
reason to reclassify broadband Internet service providers as
telecommunications, but the FCC decided not to make a reclassification
and instead attempted to implement common carrier obligations on non-
common carrier entities via ancillary jurisdiction.79 As a result, the court
held that the FCC lacked the statutory authority to regulate non-common
carriers with common carrier obligations under the FCC's classification
scheme at the time.
80
Subsequently, in 2014, the Verizon court found that the FCC's
classification of broadband Internet service providers as non-
telecommunications defers to the FCC's interpretation of the ambiguous
1996 Telecommunications Act, which gives the FCC power to define
broadband providers as it sees fit for regulatory purposes.81 As such, the
court allowed the FCC's classification so long as it is reasonable and not
arbitrary or an abuse of discretion.82  Nevertheless, the FCC kept its
classification of broadband Internet service providers as non-
telecommunications providers,83 resulting in the failure of the 2010 Open
Internet Order upon judicial review when the Court upheld that
classification.
84
As a result of the failed attempts at trying to regulate broadband
providers as non-telecommunications providers and after the courts
repeatedly stated the FCC could reclassify with good reason, the FCC
reclassified BIAS providers as telecommunications in the 2015 Open
Internet Order.85 However, the question still remains as to whether the
78. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642,661 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 635 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
82. Id.
83. See Hurst, supra note 75, at 61-62 ("One motivation the [FCC] may have had
to avoid such a reclassification was that it had previously faced opposition to the
proposal of reclassifying broadband providers as common carriers. Besides industry
opposition to common carrier regulation, forty-eight members of Congress had
requested that the Commission leave any such change in policy to the legislature in a
2010 congressional resolution.").
84. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 659.
85. See Sheraz Syed, Prioritizing Traffic: The Internet Fast Lane, 15 DEPAUL J.
ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 151, 160 (2014) (explaining that the FCC prevented
itself from regulating BIAS providers due to its past classification of these providers
even though the Courts, including the Supreme Court, assured that the FCC had the
power to reclassify them telecommunications ervice providers); see also 2015 Open
Internet Order, supra note 11 at 5614, 43 ("Exercising our delegated authority to
interpret ambiguous terms in the Communications Act, as confirmed by the Supreme
Court in Brand X,... the record reflects.., that broadband providers are offering...
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FCC's reclassification of BIAS providers as telecommunications providers
is reasonable such that the FCC's policy reversal will be upheld upon
judicial review.
The FCC explained at length in the 2015 Open Internet Order why its
policy reversal of reclassifying BIAS providers as telecommunications
providers is reasonable.86  Besides stating that the courts support the
reclassification as shown above, the FCC also illustrated that broadband
services have changed so much in recent years that a reclassification is
needed to compensate for this change.87 Therefore, the FCC has likely
justified its policy reversal.88
B. "No Throttling'" Rule is Within the FCC"s Regulatory Jurisdiction
The FCC, in developing the 2015 Open Internet Order, relied mainly on
Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 and Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.89 This Section will first consider
whether the 2015 Open Internet Order's prophylactic "no throttling" rule is
statutorily permitted by the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Afterward, this
Section will consider whether the Communications Act of 1934 prohibits
the implementation of the "no throttling" rule as it did with 2010 Open
Internet Order's rules.90 If the "no throttling" rule is justified by Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act and does not conflict with the
Communications Act of 1934, then the rule is within the FCC's regulatory
jurisdiction, which will be the conclusion of this Section.
Section 706(a) of the Telecommunications Act gives the FCC regulatory
authority to encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications
capability "by utilizing ... measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
straightforward transmission capabilities that the Communications Act defines as a
'telecommunications service."').
86. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11 at 5615, 47 ("Based on this
updated record, this Order concludes that the retail [BIAS] available today is best
viewed as separately identifiable offers of (1) a [BIAS] that is a telecommunications
service ... and (2) various 'add-on' applications, content, and services that generally
are information services. This finding more than reasonably interprets the ambiguous
terms in the Communications Act ... "); see also id at 5747-48 338 (finding that
BIAS providers are reasonably classified as telecommunications services).
87. See id at 5614, 42.
88. See id. at 5615, 49 ("By classifying [BIAS] as a telecommunications service
under Title II of the [Communications] Act, . .. the [FCC] addresses any limitations
that past classification decisions placed on the ability to adopt strong open Internet
rules, as interpreted by the D.C. Circuit in the Verizon case.").
89. Id.at5614, 41.
90. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623,659 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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barriers to infrastructure investment."' 9' The Verizon court agreed with the
FCC "that Congress. . . 'necessarily invested the Commission with the
statutory authority to carry out those acts ' 92 that will "encourage the
deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans."93  However, the court
also found that Congress limited that grant of regulatory authority by two
principles: (1) the grant of authority must be read in conjunction with the
Communications Act; and (2) the FCC must design its regulation of BIAS
for the specific purpose to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable and
timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans."94  The FCC, under Section 706(a), may carry out this
responsibility via "other regulating methods that remove barriers to
infrastructure investment.,95 The "no throttling" rule could be an "other
method" and, consequently, could fit into the statutory jurisdiction of the
FCC under Section 706(a).96
Section 706(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 grants the FCC
the ability to "take immediate action to accelerate deployment" if it finds
"that broadband is [not] being reasonably and timely deployed.,97 The
Verizon court found that the FCC had correctly interpreted Section 706(b),
giving the FCC the power accelerate broadband deployment whenever it
finds that deployment is not "reasonable and timely."98 The court also
agreed with the FCC that Section 706(b) can be interpreted to permit the
FCC to implement measures that remove barriers to promote competition
and invest in infrastructural development.99 Consequently, the FCC found
that throttling was in fact a barrier that needed to be remedied with the
2010 Open Internet Order and 2015 Open Internet Order.'00 Therefore, and
91. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2015).
92. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 637-38.
93. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
94. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 640 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a)).
95. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (emphasis added).
96. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 635-49 (illustrating that the anti-blocking and anti-
discrimination common carrier rules of the 2010 Open Internet Order fit into the
regulatory jurisdiction of the FCC because there are other methods to knock down
barriers to infrastructure development).
97. 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
98. See Verizon, 740 F.3d at 640 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b)).
99. Id. at 641.
100. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5607 16-17 ("The 2010
open Internet rule against blocking contained an ancillary prohibition against the
degradation of lawful content, applications, services, and devices, on the ground that
such degradation would be tantamount to blocking. This Order creates a separate rule
[('no throttling')] to guard against degradation targeted at specific uses of a customer's
broadband connection . . . . The ban on throttling is necessary both to fulfill the
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in accordance with the Verizon judicial review, under Section 706, the FCC
has the "valid affirmative authority to enact measures[, like the ones in the
2010 Open Internet Order,] encouraging the deployment of broadband
infrastructure."'0'
Hence, one question remains: does the 2015 Open Internet Order's "no
throttling" rule fit within the limitations of Section 706? Fortunately, the
"no throttling" rule is similar and rightly dissimilar to both the anti-
blocking and anti-discrimination rules of the 2010 Open Internet Order
such that it likely fits within Section 706. The Verizon court deemed that
both of these 2010 rules fit within the second limitation of Section 706-
providing that the FCC must design its regulation of the Internet for the
specific purpose to "encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely
basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans ' 02_
because, for example, the FCC could impose an anti-blocking rule to
prevent barriers to fast broadband deployment.10 3 However, neither of
these rules met the first limitation-requiring the grant of authority to be
read in conjunction with the Communications Act'°4-because these rules
were common carrier obligations that the FCC would impose on clearly
defined non-common carriers.'0 5 As a result, the FCC had the authority to
make the 2010 Open Internet Order's anti-blocking and anti-discrimination
rules, but it could not carry out these rules because these rules were
common carrier obligations to be imposed on BIAS providers classified as
information service providers at the time.
10 6
The "no throttling" rule is similar and dissimilar to the 2010 rules in a
manner that allows it to fit squarely within the courts' interpretation of
Section 706. The "no throttling" rule supplements the "anti-blocking"
reasonable expectations of a customer who signs up for a broadband service that
promises access to all of the lawful Internet, and to avoid gamesmanship designed to
avoid the no-blocking rule by, for example, rendering an application effectively, but
not technically, unusable.") (emphasis added).
101. See Hurst, supra note 75, at 45 (citing Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628).
102. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628, 639 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a)).
103. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5636-38, 3639-40, 90-92,
96 (blocking lawful Internet traffic allows BIAS providers to handle congestion and
priority of Internet access; however, it encourages BIAS providers not to invest in
further broadband deployment, but instead to slow down traffic to save costs).
104. Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628, 639.
105. See id. at 649 ("Even though [S]ection 706 grants the Commission authority to
promote broadband deployment by regulating how broadband providers treat edge
providers, the Commission may not, as it recognizes, utilize that power in a manner
that contravenes any specific prohibition contained in the Communications Act.").
106. See Hurst, supra note 75, at 46 ("However, even though the majority [in
Verizon] found that the Commission was authorized to make these rules, the Order
contravened one of the Commission's earlier rulings that expressly exempted
information services providers from treatment as common carriers.").
Vol. 5:2
THROTTLE ME NOT
rule-completely degrading access to lawful Internet activity-because
throttling can serve the same purpose as blocking when degradation would
be so severe that it renders access just as worthless as being blocked from
lawful Internet activity.'0 7 In this respect, the "no throttling" rule is similar
to, if not the same as, the 2010 rules which the Verizon court found that the
FCC had the authority to make.0 8 However, the "no throttling" rule is
rightfully dissimilar to the 2010 anti-blocking and anti-discrimination rules
because the FCC reasonably reclassified BIAS providers as
telecommunications under the 2015 Open Internet Order that imposes this
rule.109 Therefore, the "no throttling" rule is a common carrier obligation
applied to common carriers, allowing them to work in conjunction with the
Communications Act and meeting the second limitation of Section 706.110
Therefore, the "no throttling" rule falls within the FCC's regulatory
jurisdiction by meeting both limitations of Section 706."I
C. 2015 Open Internet Order Prohibits Throttling Unlimited Data Plans
After Reaching a Certain Data Cap
After illustrating that the FCC's reclassification of BIAS providers as
common carriers is reasonable and that the 2015 Open Internet Order's "no
throttling" rule is within the FCC's regulatory jurisdiction, this Section
analyzes whether the "no throttling" rule prohibits mobile BIAS providers
from targeting and throttling unlimited data users, or whether this BIAS
practice falls within the reasonable network management exception to the
"no throttling" rule. At first glance, the "no throttling" rule clearly
prohibits cellphone carriers from throttling unlimited data plans.",
2
However, the "no throttling" rule states that mobile BIAS providers may
not throttle unless that throttling practice fits within the "reasonable
107. See supra parenthetical accompanying note 100.
108. See supra text and parenthetical accompanying note 106; see also 2015 Open
Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5614, 42 ("The Verizon decision thus made clear
that [S]ection 706 affords the Commission substantive authority, and that open Internet
protections are within scope of that authority.").
109. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5615-16 50 ("Having
classified broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications service, we
respond to the Verizon court's holding, supporting our open Internet rules under the
Commission's Title II authority and removing any common carriage limitation on the
exercise of our [S]ection 706 authority."); see also supra Section 11(A) (deducing that
the FCC reasonably reclassified BIAS providers as telecommunications providers by
looking at judicial history and the FCC's reasons for reclassification in the 2015 Open
Internet Order).
110. See supra note 109.
111. See supra note 109.
112. See supra parenthetical accompanying note 56 (presenting the "no throttling"
rule).
2016 249
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LA W REVIEW
network management" exception.' 13 Hence, this Section proceeds to
determine whether cellphone carriers' targeting and throttling of unlimited
data plans is a practice that fits within the "reasonable network
management" exception to the "no throttling" rule. To make this
determination, this Section will first consider whether cellphone carriers
throttle for business incentives by presenting gatekeeper and market power
analyses. If the carriers do, then their throttling is not a "reasonable
network management" practice,"' and consequently, as this Section will
conclude, the 2015 Open Internet Order's "no throttling" rule prohibits
such throttling.
1. Business Incentives to Throttle
To determine whether cellphone carriers' decision to target and throttle
unlimited data users is a reasonable network management practice, any
other reason than one that serves as a legitimate network concern will
prohibit the throttling practice under the "no throttling" rule.'
15
Accordingly, Subsection III(C)(1)(a) of this Comment analyzes economic
and technical ability reasons for throttling, and Subsection III(C)(1)(b)
analyzes market power reasons for throttling. From these analyses, there
are adequate justifications as to why targeting and throttling unlimited data
users is a practice that falls outside the "reasonable network management"
exception and is prohibited by the "no throttling" rule.
a. Gatekeeper Analysis: Economic and Technical Ability to Throttle
Mobile BIAS providers act as Internet access gatekeepers, where all
mobile access to and from the Internet must go through them." 6 As a
result, mobile BIAS providers are in a position to easily interfere with
mobile user access to the Internet, including slowing down Internet traffic
113. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 57 (presenting the "reasonable
network management" exception).
114. See supra notes 59-60.
115. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (illustrating how the "no
throttling" rule works in conjunction with its "reasonable network management"
exception and pointing out what kind of practice the FCC considered did not fit within
the exception).
116. See Hurst, supra note 75, at 55 (quoting Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646-
47 (D.C. Cir. 2014)) (stating "the [Verizon] court recognized that because end users
typically receive broadband from a single provider, that provider 'functions as a
terminating monopolist with power to act as a "gatekeeper" to [content] providers'
and as a "gatekeeper" to consumers because of high switching costs). See generally
JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 220-26 (2d ed. 2013)




to and from a user (i.e., throttling). 17 Consequently, this model provides
economic incentives to throttle so long as the mobile BIAS providers have
the technical ability to do so.1 8
First, mobile BIAS providers have the technical ability to throttle at
varying levels."19 Instead of limiting the speed of all users on a congested
tower (i.e., cell site), some mobile BIAS providers may choose to throttle
particular customers with certain plans,'20 while others may choose to limit
their heaviest data consumers. Hence, cellphone carriers are able to
determine specific tower usage and limit any particular usage as they deem122
necessary.
Second, mobile BIAS providers have economic incentives to throttle
especially in rural areas.23 Building cell towers for few customers is an
expensive venture for mobile BIAS providers because low population
densities provide for slow investment recovery.' 24 In many rural areas, the
population is so low that the number of cellphone users in these rural areas
hardly justifies the cost of mobile broadband infrastructure development-
i.e., cellphone subscriptions may be too few in some areas to pay for
infrastructural investment.25  Furthermore, thanks to the broadband
117. See Hurst, supra note 75, at 55 (citing Verizon, 740 F.3d at 645-46)
(emphasizing that Verizon did not deny it had the ability to throttle).
118. Id.
119. See id.; see also 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5639-40, 96.
120. See, e.g., supra note 2 (throttling after 21 GB by T-Mobile, after 22 GB by
AT&T, and after 23 GB by Sprint).
121. See, e.g., Justin S. Brown & Andrew W. Bagley, Neutrality 2.0: The
Broadband Transition to Transparency, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
639, 676 (2015) (citing Important Information About Verizon Wireless Broadband
Internet Access Services, VERIZON WIRELESS, http://www.verizonwireless.com/sup
port/information/broadband.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2015)) (addressing congestion
management, Verizon may throttle its customers within the top five percent of Verizon
Wireless data customers).
122. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5628-34, 78-85; see also,
e.g., id.; supra note 2.
123. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5639-40, 96 (pointing out
that mobile providers throttle customers using unlimited data plans "in ways that
effectively force them to switch to price plans with less generous data allowances");
see also The National Broadband Plan, supra note 14, at 136-37 (finding that carriers
providing BIAS in rural areas have no business case to offer untainted broadband
services because the cost of deploying and operating BIAS in low population densities
makes it difficult to recover investment costs).
124. See The National Broadband Plan, supra note 14, at 136.
125. See generally 2014 Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 5, at
15367-68, 112-13 ("Based on the data, tower operators build and operate more
towers and [distributed antenna systems (DAS)] nodes in densely populated areas in
order to support better coverage and more wireless data usage. For example as of
September 2013, the average number of tower and DAS sites per county is 29 for
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availability gap, there are many more upfront costs associated with
bringing mobile broadband to rural areas with no broadband access as
compared to upgrading already existing urban infrastructure.'26 Therefore,
private investment is unlikely to fill in the broadband availability gap when
it is easier to throttle than build or upgrade a rural tower to handle the
higher demand on the network.
127
Therefore, throttling allows mobile BIAS providers to unreasonably
manage networks instead of investing in infrastructure. 28 Slowing down
heavy data users, rather than building new towers or updating old towers to
handle the data consumption needs of their customers, is easier and
cheaper.129  In fact, many popular speakers, including former President
Clinton, have spoken on this matter. 13  As such, throttling seems to be a
pure business policy especially when targeted at a particular customer
base.131  Hence, targeting and throttling unlimited data users is not a
counties with a population density between 75 and 100 persons per square mile,
compared with an average of 377 per county for counties with a population density
between 2000 and 4000 .... In addition, there are also more tower operators in densely
populated counties.., than less populated counties .... The numbers range from two
operators per county in rural counties with one person or less per square mile and an
average land size of 11,122 square miles to more than seven operators in dense urban
counties with a population density of more than 4000 and an average land size of 98
square miles .. ").
126. Id. at 136-38.
127. See id. at 15369, 114 ("[A] significant constraint[] faced by wireless
infrastructure providers that need to add or modify tower.., sites [is] capital
expenditure .... In terms of capital expenditure, collocating wireless equipment on
existing structures is often the most efficient and economical solution for mobile
wireless service providers that need new cell sites, either to expand their existing
coverage area, increase their capacity, or deploy 4G broadband services. The average
cost to build a new tower is between $250,000 and $300,000, whereas the average cost
of collocation on an existing tower is less than 25 percent of the total cost of a new
tower."); see also 2015 Broadband Progress Report, supra note 15, at 1457, 146
("Broadband service reliability remains a key factor to broadband availability. Low
broadband service quality has the potential to affect adoption rates, which in turn may
affect customer demand, leading to less deployment.").
128. See supra notes 123-127 (providing that costs associated with building and
updating cellphone towers are high, where cellphone carriers take business incentive to
throttle to avoid high investment costs-slowing unlimited data customers down so
much that they effectively force customers to switch to more limited data plans that are
less demanding on networks, preventing the need to build and update cellphone towers
to handle increased demand on broadband networks).
129. See explanatory parenthetical accompanying supra note 128.
130. See President Clinton Interview, supra note 3 and corresponding text.
131. See 2015 Broadband Progress Report, supra note 15, at 1457, 146
("Broadband service reliability remains a key factor to broadband availability. Low
broadband service quality has the potential to affect adoption rates, which in turn may
affect customer demand, leading to less deployment. Broadband service quality
remains an essential component of broadband deployment. Providers must maintain
and upgrade their broadband offerings to ensure that high-quality broadband remains
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"reasonable network management" practice because it is just a business
tactic creating user dissatisfaction.'
32
b. Market Power Analysis: Mobile BIAS Providers Throttle Because
They Can "Get Away With It"
Mobile BIAS providers have significant market power to implement
unfavorable policies in many parts of the United States,1 33 with little to no
backlash from customers, 134 because many rural customers only have
access to one or two cellphone carriers.135 For example, if a cellphone
carrier is the only mobile BIAS provider in the area, then it has
considerable market power, and its customers inevitably suffer the
unfavorable policies it implements, or they go without cell service.
Likewise, there may be multiple cellphone carriers in an area that act in
concert and implement collectively unfavorable policies,136 rendering
switching cellphone carriers practically ineffective. Similarly, maybe not
all of the carriers in an area implement unfavorable policies like the
practice of throttling, but the switching penalties may be so high that the
available to consumers.").
132. See supra note 4 (showing customer dissatisfaction).
133. Compare NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 116, at 220-21 (citing 2010
Open Internet Order) ("[M]ost economic advocacy for net neutrality regulation begins
with the argument that there is inadequate competition in the residential broadband
marketplace and that the government should step in to prevent abuses of the resulting
market power... [that] 'is highest in markets with few competitors."'), with id. at 220-
24 (presenting the general view of the net neutrality opponents that "the retail Internet
access market is more competitive and dynamic than net neutrality advocates contend"
because, even when there are only a few broadband providers in an area, they will act
competitively and fairly for their own interests of keeping their customers satisfied and
to attract new customers).
134. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5642, 1 99 ("The provision of
wireless service involves the interaction between the wireless network operator, the
various edge providers, the customer's handset or other equipment, and the conditions
present in the specific location the customer wishes to use the service. In this
environment, it can be very difficult for customers to ascertain the source of a service
disruption, and hence whether switching wireless providers would solve the
problem."); see also 2014 Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 5 at 15325
(Chart II.B.6) (illustrating that only 1.3% to 4% of customers on any of the four
national cellphone carriers actually switch).
135. See National Broadband Map: Number of Broadband Providers, supra note 6
(selecting "wireless" for provider type and comparing minimum at two and three
providers and seeing a significant decrease in mobile broadband coverage with three
providers. After comparing the minimum provider count at four and five, there is only
a small portion of the United States with five or more mobile BIAS providers-keep in
mind that data is likely overstated because mobile broadband service may not exist in
the entire census block.).
136. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 4 (pointing out that all of the major mobile BIAS
providers implemented throttling polices at one time or another).
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cost of switching outweighs avoiding the throttling policy.'
37
Regardless of the situation presented above, cellphone carriers can make
the business move to target and throttle unlimited data users, especially in
rural areas, without worrying that they will lose business in these throttled
areas38 because of their significant market power, which is not throttling
for "reasonable network management" purposes.
2. Throttling Unlimited Data Plans Does Not Meet the Network
Management Practice Exception
Knowing how and why mobile BIAS providers throttle their
customers,139 the question that this Comment seeks to answer still remains:
can cellphone carriers target and throttle unlimited data users? This
Subsection will answer this question in the negative.
The previous sections illustrate that mobile BIAS providers target and
throttle unlimited data users for business purposes, not "reasonable network
management" purposes. 14  Since cellphone service providers have the
economic incentive and technical ability to throttle, then viewing their
throttling practices as "reasonable network management" is mentally
taxing, especially when targeting specific groups of customers (like
unlimited data plan users).'41
Moreover, a "reasonable network management" practice is not one that
treats similarly situated users differently.142 Cellphone carriers claim that
they throttle as a means to manage their networks, where they throttle their
unlimited data users over their limited data users as a means to give all its
customers an equal opportunity to use fast Internet.143  However, this
137. See supra parentheticals accompanying note 134 (explaining chum rates and
low percentage of customer switching).
138. See supra notes 133-135.
139. See supra Section III(C)(1)(a) (explaining mobile BIAS providers' gatekeeper
power); supra Section III(C)(1)(b) (explaining mobile BIAS providers' market power).
140. See supra Section III(C)(1)(a) (explaining that mobile BIAS providers have
economic and technological abilities to throttle, and they do so by targeting unlimited
data users or other specific groups of users for purposes other than network
management); supra Section III(C)(1)(b) (explaining mobile BIAS providers have
strong economic incentives to throttle because they simply can when there is little-to-
no competition in many areas in the United States).
141. See supra parentheticals and text accompanying notes 56-60 (explaining the
"no throttling" rule and its exception).
142. 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5700, 216.
143. See, e.g., John Saw, Protecting the 97%, SPRINT (Oct. 17, 2015, 12:00 AM)
http://newsroom.sprint.com/blogs/sprint-perspectives/protecting-the-97.htm ("As we
continue to improve our network, and as data usage across the industry continues to
skyrocket, we're always looking at ways to better manage our network resources and
improve the customer experience. One way we aim to make the customer experience
better is to protect against the possibility that a small minority of customers might
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throttling practice permits different levels of network access to similarly
situated users. So long as a limited data user has not reached her specified
data cap, she receives top speeds for the agreed upon price of the limited
data plan. By definition, however, unlimited data users cannot reach a data
cap, so they are users in the same situation as limited data users who have
not reached their limited data caps, yet the unlimited data users are the only
ones throttled for network management. This practice is discriminatory'
44
and does not satisfy the "reasonable network management" exception to the
"no throttling" rule.'45 Therefore, targeting and throttling unlimited data
users does not meet the "reasonable network management" exception when
throttling everyone for a legitimate network issue would be more
reasonable. 1
46
Additionally, the other result is that throttling unlimited data users in
rural areas does not meet the "reasonable network management" exception
on two grounds: (1) it targets a specific group; and (2) it occurs because it
is cheaper to do so in rural areas than investing in rural infrastructure.
Neither of these are "reasonable network management" practices; rather,
they are business choices that are not exception-worthy and are prohibited
by the "no throttling" rule.
47
IV. FCC GOT IT RIGHT WITH THE "No THROTTLING" RULE
The 2015 Open Internet Order's "no throttling" rule should remain
unchanged and effective because it completely bans throttling except for
"reasonable network management"' 148 and because it serves both consumers
and providers equally well, making it a good public policy.149  For
example, a "reasonable network management" practice would be throttling
everyone's data usage and not just targeting and slowing down certain
users when there is high bandwidth demand on a tower or some other
occupy an unreasonable share of network resources .... [I]f [unlimited data customers]
use more than 23GB of data during a billing cycle, they will be prioritized on the
network below other customers for the remainder of their billing cycle, only in times
and locations where the network is constrained.").
144. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5700 216 (explaining that a
practice that applies "different levels of network access for similarly situated users
based solely on the particular plan to which the user has subscribed" does not fall
within the exception for "reasonable network management").
145. See supra parentheticals and text accompanying notes 59-60.
146. See supra notes 56-60.
147. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5700, 216 ("If a practice is
primarily motivated by such an other justification,... then that practice will not be
considered under this exception.").
148. See supra parentheticals and text accompanying notes 56-57 (presenting the
"no throttling" rule and its exception).
149. See supra parentheticals and text accompanying notes 58-60.
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legitimate reason. In this scenario, the mobile BIAS providers benefit
because they are able to reasonably manage their mobile networks when
they see fit, and the consumers benefit because they receive a consistent
service while not being discriminated against by their BIAS providers.
However, targeting and throttling unlimited data plan customers (or
customers in the top percent of data users) is not an acceptable practice that
falls within this exception to the "no throttling" rule.'50 In this situation,
the mobile BIAS providers benefit because their throttling practices allow
them to save on costs for needed infrastructural development151 while the
consumers do not benefit because they are discriminatorily being throttled.
In fact, the throttling here occurs on a small percentage of the customers
(i.e., unlimited data users), which is likely not enough to provide a better
service for all consumers using the mobile BIAS.15' The following two
sections will provide additional reasoning for the recommendation that the
"no throttling" rule and its exception ought to remain unchanged and
effective.
A. In a United States Where Unreasonable Throttling Is Allowed
Today's America does not make imagining the lack of a "no throttling"
rule difficult considering the FCC just released the rule in March 2015,153
and cellphone carriers continue to throttle their unlimited data customers as
if the rule does not exist.154 However, if the "no throttling" rule does not
exist, not only will mobile data consumers suffer at the expense of the
mobile BIAS providers filling their coffers,155 but consumers will also
150. See supra parentheticals and text accompanying notes 59-60 (explaining that
the FCC will not consider the practice of targeting and throttling unlimited data users
under the "reasonable network management" exception).
151. See supra parenthetical and text accompanying notes 125-127 (explaining that
the costs associated with building and updating cellphone towers are high and that
mobile service providers take the business incentive to throttle to avoid high
investment costs. These actions slow unlimited data customers down so much that they
effectively force these customers to switch to more limited data plans that are less
demanding on the networks, and they also aid these mobile providers by preventing the
need to build and update cellphone towers to handle the increased demand on mobile
broadband networks.).
152. But see, e.g., Saw, supra note 143 (claiming that throttling only "a small
minority of customers [who] might occupy an unreasonable share of network
resources" will improve overall customer experience).
153. See Open Internet, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/openinternet (last visited June
27, 2015).
154. See supra note 2.
155. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5640-42, 97-98
(illustrating that, because of limited competition in many areas and stringent switching
policies, consumers will likely be stuck with throttling and other unfavorable policies).
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suffer from a lack of broadband infrastructure development.156 As a result,
the United States will likely lose its place as an international leader in
broadband development when many American communities still lack
sufficient broadband access, which prevents the United States from
competing at full economic potential-a consequence that is neither far-
fetched nor too far from realization.
1 57
1. Case Study: Economic Impact on Rural Areas
Consider the negative economic effects of throttling on rural areas.
Allowing throttling in rural areas, just because it is easier and cheaper than
investing in rural infrastructure to meet users needs,158 is bad policy for two
reasons: (1) quality broadband access brings jobs; and (2) mobile
broadband may be the only efficient way to build up a broadband network
in some rural areas.
First, sufficient broadband access brings jobs, causing local economies to
thrive since today's economies rely on fast, reliable Internet access.1 59 For
instance, mobile broadband supports and builds rural economies because
rural producers and storeowners can put their products online and manage
their online presence on the go.'60  Furthermore, many jobs require
broadband access.'61 For example, technology companies thrive in today's
market; however, none of these companies are going to move to a rural
area that lacks fast, reliable broadband access.
Even though approximately ninety-nine percent of the United States
population has access to broadband, only a small percentage of rural areas
actually have access to quality broadband service.162 The same holds true
156. See supra parentheticals and text accompanying notes 123-131 (throttling
affects broadband infrastructure development in rural areas, negatively affecting
economic opportunities in rural areas).
157. See, e.g., Tony Brown, South Korea: What happened to the broadband
wonderland?, NBN BLOG (Feb. 5, 2015) http://www.nbnco.com.au/blog/south-korea-
what-happened-to-the-broadband-wonderland.html (pointing out that South Korea had
almost reached a perfect broadband network, increasing competitive advantage).
158. See supra notes 125-127 (providing the costs associated with building and
updating cellphone towers are high, where mobile service providers take the business
incentive to throttle to avoid high investment costs in low population).
159. See White House Net Neutrality Press Release, supra note 54.
160. See, e.g., The National Broadband Plan, supra note 14, at 136-37 ("Diller,
Neb., population 287, is home to Blue Valley Meats, which has seen its business grow
more than 30% and its employee ranks double over the last five years [at the time of
this study], thanks in large part to the creation of a website to extend its product
reach.").
161. See White House Net Neutrality Press Release, supra note 54.
162. The National Broadband Plan, supra note 14, at 136-37; see also 2015
Broadband Progress Report, supra note 15, at 1457, 146 (discussing quality of
service and broadband deployment affecting broadband adoption rates).
2016 THROTTLE ME NOT 257
AMERICAN UNIVERSITYBUSINESS LA WREVIEW
for mobile broadband, except coverage is much more spotty in rural areas,
resulting in such an unreliable quality of service that there may be no
service where coverage maps show otherwise.163 As such, some rural users
statistically have mobile broadband access but actually do not for a variety
of reasons-e.g., a mountain blocks a user's signal, or a user lives at the
very edge of a cellphone tower's range.164 Therefore, there are many areas
in the United States that do not have sufficient broadband access to
successfully compete economically.
Second, since mobile broadband may be the only efficient way to build
up a broadband network in some rural areas, throttling policies threaten
infrastructural growth of broadband access in these areas.1 65 For example,
consider the case of rural Africa where, instead of building costly-wired
broadband networks, cellphone towers are installed, and cellphones are
passed out to get a very rural community online.'66 However, once demand
on these towers outgrows their throughput capabilities, then cellphone
carriers have two options: to invest in more capable towers or to throttle the
towers' users to keep demand pegged at the capabilities of the towers. As a
result of the second option, the economy of the affected area will suffer
because it will not be able to compete with other areas that have non-
throttled access to broadband Internet. Rural America suffers the same fate
when trying to compete with non-throttled, more capable urban broadband
networks because jobs likely leave or do not even come to these rural
areas. 167
Hence, throttling and similar policies stifle innovation and infrastructural
growth, which is a huge detriment to rural communities lacking adequate
broadband access.168 In fact, throttling is a way to settle with existing
infrastructure to handle user capacity instead of building it up to meet
consumer needs.169  Moreover, since cellphone carriers would rather
throttle in rural areas for business purposes (it is cheaper to throttle than to
163. See 2015 Broadband Progress Report, supra note 15, at 1457, 146; see also
2014 Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 5, at 15405, 190 (explaining
carriers claim broader service coverage area than actually provided).
164. See 2014 Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 5, at 15405, 190.
165. The National Broadband Plan, supra note 14, at 136-37; see also 2015
Broadband Progress Report, supra note 15, at 1457, 146 (discussing quality of
service and broadband deployment affecting broadband adoption rates).
166. See Amir Efrati, Google to Fund, Develop Wireless Networks in Emerging
Markets, WALL ST. J. (May 24, 2013, 6:33 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887323975004578503350402434918.
167. See The National Broadband Plan, supra note 14, at 136-37 (explaining the
availability broadband gap); see also supra note 135 (showing the need for mobile
broadband in many rural areas).
168. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5703-04, 1223.
169. See supra notes 123-128.
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invest in infrastructure),70 the 2015 Open Internet Order's "no throttling"
rule is especially good policy for rural America since throttling in these
areas is not a "reasonable network management" practice necessary to
avoid the applicability of the "no throttling" rule.'
71
B. In a United States with the "No Throttling'" Rule in Effect
If the "no throttling" rule of the 2015 Open Internet Order were to
remain unchanged and effective, then the pace of mobile broadband
infrastructure development in the United States would likely quicken
because the rule de-incentivizes the idea that throttling is easier than
developing broadband infrastructure. 72 Consequently, the United States
would prosper from all of its regions having adequate broadband access to
sustain economic tranquility and from being able to compete at its full
potential in the international arena.
Furthermore, the rule provides a balanced, beneficial situation for both
consumers and mobile BIAS providers.173 This rule permits one to imagine
an America without throttling, where mobile BIAS providers implement
policies that allow their customers to access the Internet at full speed
regardless of the data plan they choose.'74 Accordingly, to ensure that their
customers have this full access, they are incentivized to develop mobile
broadband infrastructure and create better policies to manage networks
170. ld
171. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (presenting the "no throttling"
rule and its exception); see also 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5653,
124 ("We emphasize, however, that to be eligible for consideration under the
reasonable network management exception, a network management practice that would
otherwise violate the no-throttling rule must be used reasonably and primarily for
network management purposes, and not for business purposes.").
172. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5700, 216; see also Marc S.
Martin, Janis Claire Kestenbaum, and Brendon P. Fowler, A Closer Look At FCC's
$100M AT&T Penalty, LAw360 (July 7, 2015, 10:10 AM) http://www.law360.com/
articles/675909/a-closer-look-at-fcc-s-100m-at-t-penalty ("[T]he language used in the
[notice of apparent liability] suggests that the FCC's [proposed $100 million penalty
against AT&T] is not merely guided by a neutral mathematical calculation but by
broader policy objectives.").
173. See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 11, at 5703, 1 223 ("We believe that
the reasonable network management exception provides... mobile broadband
providers sufficient flexibility to manage their networks. We recognize.., that the
additional challenges involved in mobile broadband network management [as
compared to fixed broadband] mean that mobile broadband providers may have a
greater need to apply network management practices... to balance supply and demand
while accommodating mobility.").
174. See id. at 5663, 142 ("As the Verizon court recognized, Internet openness
drives a 'virtuous cycle' in which innovations at the edges of the network enhance
consumer demand, leading to expanded investments in broadband infrastructure that, in
turn, spark new innovations at the edge.").
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Throttling-a popular way for cellphone carriers to manage their
networks by slowing down their users-is prohibited by the 2015 Open
Internet Order's "no throttling" rule. Considering that the rule is supported
by judicial precedent and is within the FCC's regulatory jurisdiction, it is
likely to survive judicial review. Moreover, targeting and throttling
unlimited data users is not a "reasonable network management" practice
but a practice prohibited by the "no throttling" rule. Therefore, the "no
throttling" rule should remain unchanged and effective because it protects
unlimited data plan users and promotes growth and development of
broadband infrastructure, specially in rural areas.
175. See id.
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